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Judgment aggregation with consistency alone
Franz Dietrich and Christian List1
30 May 2007
Abstract
All existing impossibility theorems on judgment aggregation require individ-
ual and collective judgment sets to be consistent and complete (in some recent
results with completeness relaxed to deductive closure), arguably a demand-
ing rationality requirement. They do not carry over to aggregation functions
mapping proles of (merely) consistent individual judgment sets to (merely)
consistent collective ones. We prove that, whenever the agenda of propositions
under consideration exhibits mild interconnections, any such aggregation func-
tion that is "neutral" between the acceptance and rejection of each proposition
is dictatorial. We relate this theorem to the literature.
1 Introduction
There are now many impossibility results on the aggregation of individual judg-
ments on logically connected propositions (such as a, a! b and b) into collective
judgments. Sparked by the observation that majority voting fails to guaran-
tee rational collective judgments for some proles of individual judgments (as
illustrated in table 1, where majority voting in a three-member group leads
to inconsistent collective judgments), several authors have shown that any ag-
gregation function that has certain properties in common with majority voting
does so too (List and Pettit 2002, 2004; Pauly and van Hees 2006; Dietrich 2006,
2007; Gärdenfors 2006; Nehring and Puppe 2002, 2005, 2006; van Hees 2007;
Mongin 2005; Dietrich and List 2005, 2006, 2007a; Dokow and Holzman 2005,
2006; the literature goes back to the "doctrinal" and "discursive paradoxes" in
Kornhauser and Sager 1986 and Pettit 2001).
a a! b b
Individual 1 True True True
Individual 2 True False False
Individual 3 False True False
Majority True True False
Table 1: A majority inconsistency
1Addresses: C. List, Department of Government, London School of Economics, London
WC2A 2AE, U.K.; F. Dietrich, Department of Quantitative Economics, University of Maas-
tricht, P.O. Box 616, 6200 MD Maastricht, The Netherlands.
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Almost all of these impossibility results formalize rationality as the conjunc-
tion of two requirements. Individual and collective judgments must be both
logically consistent and complete, i.e., the set of accepted propositions must
not entail a contradiction (consistency) and it must contain a member of every
proposition-negation pair under consideration (completeness). This is a strong
reqirement, whose completeness part, in particular, has been criticized as being
too demanding in many real-world decision-making settings (see especially Gär-
denfors 2006, but also List and Pettit 2002, Dietrich and List 2007b, Goodin
and List 2006). Often individuals and groups wish to abstain from making any
judgment on certain proposition-negation pairs. Courts and expert panels, for
example, may wish to abstain from making judgments on issues on which there
is too much uncertainty, and legislatures and international decision-making bod-
ies, such as the EU Council of Ministers or the UN Security Council, on issues
on which there is too much disagreement.
But while some recent impossibility results (Gärdenfors 2006, Dietrich and
List 2006, Dokow and Holzman 2006) give up the completeness requirement in
favour of deductive closure i.e., any proposition under consideration that is
entailed by other accepted propositions must also be accepted it is so far an
open question whether judgment aggregation faces any serious impossibilities
if only consistency is required. This question is interesting, since consistency
is the most natural and least contentious requirement of rationality. One may
not expect compelling impossibility results if consistency is the only rationality
requirement: all of the standard conditions on judgment aggregation functions
(including independence/systematicity and only excluding completeness and
deductive closure) are satised, for example, by suitable (symmetrical) super-
majority rules (for details, see section 4). Thus these standard conditions do
not lead to any impossibilities in the case of consistency alone.
However, we here introduce a new condition, acceptance/rejection neutrality,
and show that, if (and only if) the agenda of propositions under consideration
satises a mild condition, any acceptance/rejection neutral aggregation function
that maps consistent individual judgments to consistent collective ones is dicta-
torial. Acceptance/rejection neutrality requires the aggregation function not to
be biased either for or against the acceptance of any proposition. This condition
is a variant of Mays (1952) neutrality condition on a single binary choice and the
conditions of neutrality-within-issues in Nehring and Puppe (2005) and unbi-
asedness in Dietrich and List (2005). Although our present result is the rst one
with the weak rationality requirement of consistency alone, it is mathematically
related to the results of the latter two sets of authors using neutrality-within-
issues or unbiasedness under the "full" rationality requirement of consistency
and completeness. But the possible incompleteness of judgments in our result
creates subtleties in dening neutrality that do not arise when judgments are
complete, as explained below. In particular, the earlier denitions of neutrality
are unsuitable for obtaining our present result.
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Our result should be interpreted as a baseline result. One may not always
wish to demand acceptance/rejection neutrality. However, it is surprising that,
under the present weak rationality requirement, this single condition on the
aggregation function su¢ ces to characterize dictatorships. Below we also briey
discuss the relationship of our result with the literature on belief merging in
computer science (e.g., Konieczny and Pino-Perez 2002).
2 The model
We consider a group of individuals N = f1; 2; : : : ; ng (n  2) making judgments
on some propositions represented in logic (Dietrich 2007, generalizing List and
Pettit 2002, 2004).
Logic. To dene a logic, let L be a set of sentences, called propositions, closed
under negation (i.e., if p 2 L then :p 2 L, where : is the negation symbol), and
stipulate that each subset S  L is either consistent or inconsistent, subject
to standard axioms.2 In standard propositional logic, for example, L contains
propositions such as a, b, a ^ b, a _ b, :(a ! b) (where ^, _, ! denote
"and", "or", "if-then", respectively); sets such as fa; a! b; bg and fa ^ bg are
consistent, while sets such as fa;:ag and fa; a! b;:bg are inconsistent.
Agenda. The agenda is the set of propositions on which judgments are to be
made, dened as a non-empty subset X  L expressible as X = fp;:p : p 2
X+g for a set X+  L of unnegated propositions. Double negations cancel each
other out, i.e., ::p stands for p.3 In the example in table 1, X is fa;:a; a !
b;:(a! b); b;:bg in standard propositional logic (or in a conditional logic). A
subset Y  X that forms an agenda itself (i.e., is non-empty and expressible
as fp;:p : p 2 Y+g with Y+ containing unnegated propositions) is called a
sub-agenda of X.
Individual judgment sets. Each individual is judgment set is the set Ai 
X of propositions that he or she accepts (e.g., believes to be true). A prole is
an n-tuple (A1; : : : ; An) of individual judgment sets. Each judgment set may or
may not be consistent.
2C1: For any p 2 L, fp;:pg is inconsistent. C2: If S  L is inconsistent, then so is any
superset T  S (in L). C3: ; is consistent, and each consistent S  L has a consistent
superset T  S (in L) containing a member of each pair p;:p 2 L. C4: Any inconsistent set
S  L has a nite inconsistent subset T  S. For details, see Dietrich (2007).
3Strictly speaking, when we use the negation symbol : hereafter, we mean a modied
negation symbol , where  p := :p if p is not a negated proposition and  p := q if p = :q
for some q.
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Aggregation functions. An aggregation function is a function F that maps
each prole (A1; : : : ; An) in some domain of admissible ones to a collective judg-
ment set F (A1; : : : ; An) = A  X, interpreted as the set of propositions that
the group as a whole accepts. An aggregation function is consistent if it pro-
duces a consistent collective judgment set as output. It has full domain if
the admissible proles are all proles of consistent individual judgment sets.
This domain is larger than the so-called universal domain, which additionally
requires completeness of individual judgment sets.
Examples of aggregation functions aremajority voting, where for each prole
of consistent individual judgment sets (A1; :::; An),
F (A1; :::; An) = fp 2 X : jfi 2 N : p 2 Aigj > jfi 2 N : p =2 Aigjg,
and a dictatorship of individual i 2 N , where, for each such (A1; :::; An),
F (A1; :::; An) = Ai:
Majority voting has full domain but is not consistent, as noted above. Dictator-
ships, by contrast, have full domain and are consistent. We also call an aggre-
gation function a dictatorship (of individual i 2 N) on a sub-agenda Y  X,
if, for each prole (A1; :::; An), F (A1; :::; An) \ Y = Ai \ Y .
3 Result
To state our result, we need to introduce its condition on the agenda and its
condition on the aggregation function.
The condition on the agenda. The agenda X is non-simple if it has a
minimal inconsistent subset S  X of three or more propositions (where an
inconsistent set is minimal if every proper subset is consistent); X is non-
separable if it cannot be partitioned into two sub-agendas X1 and X2 such
that S1 [ S2 is consistent for any consistent subsets S1  X1 and S2  X2.
For example, the agenda X = fa;:a; a ! b;:(a ! b); b;:bg is non-simple
(take S = fa; a ! b;:bg) and non-separable (as easily seen). The (trivial)
agendaX = fa;:a; b;:bg is neither non-simple (its largest minimal inconsistent
subsets are fa;:ag and fb;:bg) nor non-separable (take X1 = fa;:ag and
X2 = fb;:bg).
The condition on the aggregation function. An aggregation function F
is acceptance/rejection neutral if, for any proposition p 2 X and admissible
proles (A1; : : : ; An); (A1; : : : ; A

n),
[for all i 2 N , p 2 Ai , p =2 Ai ]) [p 2 F (A1; : : : ; An), p =2 F (A1; : : : ; An)].
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Acceptance/rejection neutrality is inspired by Mays (1952) condition of neu-
trality in a binary choice. It requires that if the individuals accepting some
proposition p in one prole are the same as those rejecting p in another, then p
is collectively accepted in the rst prole if and only if it is collectively rejected
in the second. Informally, as noted above, this requires the aggregation function
not to be biased either for or against the acceptance of any proposition. Major-
ity voting (for odd group size) and dictatorships are clearly acceptance/rejection
neutral. (These examples are quite special: they use the same decision criterion
for each proposition, although not required by acceptance/rejection neutral-
ity.) Under the full rationality requirement of consistency and completeness,
acceptance/rejection neutrality becomes equivalent to the earlier conditions of
unbiasedness (Dietrich and List 2005) and (essentially) neutrality-within-issues
(Nehring and Puppe 2005). Without full rationality, however, there are cru-
cial di¤erences between the present condition and those earlier conditions, as
explained in the next section.
Theorem 1 If (and only if) the agenda is non-simple and non-separable, every
consistent full-domain aggregation function satisfying acceptance/rejection neu-
trality is a dictatorship.4
Under the mild rationality requirement of consistency and the mild agenda
condition of non-simplicity and non-separability, as satised by all the lead
examples in the literature on judgment aggregation, acceptance/rejection neu-
trality thus fully characterizes the class of dictatorships. The following corollary,
which applies to every agenda, is also of interest:
Corollary 1 Every consistent full-domain aggregation function satisfying ac-
ceptance/rejection neutrality is a dictatorship on every non-simple and non-
separable sub-agenda.
(In particular, since every non-simple agenda has at least one non-simple and
non-separable sub-agenda, corollary 1 implies that, for any non-simple agenda,
acceptance/rejection neutrality leads to a "local dictatorship".)
As noted in the introduction, our result (theorem 1 and corollary 1) can be
seen as a "consistency-alone" analogue of earlier characterizations of ("global"
and "local") dictatorships by Nehring and Puppe (2005) and Dietrich and List
(2005) using neutrality-within-issues or unbiasedness under full rationality. In
the appendix, we derive our result from Dietrich and Lists result. Surprisingly,
our new theorem, despite its weaker rationality requirement, requires fewer
conditions on the aggregation function than the Nehring and Puppe result and
equivalent conditions on the agenda as it;5 and it requires fewer conditions on
4The "only if" part requires n  3.
5The results additional aggregation condition is monotonicity (without it, there are coun-
terexamples). The agenda conditions ("not a median space" and "not decomposable") can
be shown to be equivalent to ours (non-simplicity and non-separability).
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the agenda than the Dietrich and List result and equivalent conditions on the
aggregation function as it.6
4 Discussion
We have proved the rst impossibility theorem on judgment aggregation un-
der the rationality requirement of consistency alone. Why is this interesting?
It is interesting not only because consistency is the least contentious require-
ment of rationality, but also because the result connects judgment aggregation
with the important related body of literature on belief merging in computer
science (Konieczny and Pino-Perez 2002, Pigozzi 2006). In belief merging, sev-
eral consistent sets of propositions in some language have to be merged into
a single consistent set. The individual sets need not be complete, and their
elements need not be drawn from the same (small) agenda. This problem is
equivalent to judgment aggregation with the agenda X chosen to comprise the
entire language L or a su¢ ciently large portion of it and consistency as the
only rationality requirement. Conditions of propositionwise aggregation are not
usually considered in that literature, but our present result provides an insight
into what is needed to characterize dictatorships in a belief merging context.
Crucially, under the rationality requirement of consistency alone, none of the
standard conditions on aggregation functions used in the literature including
the standard neutrality conditions lead to an impossibility result. Consider
the conditions of systematicity, unbiasedness, independence, monotonicity, the
unanimity principle and anonymity. Systematicity requires that, for any pair
of propositions p; q 2 X and admissible proles (A1; : : : ; An); (A1; : : : ; An),
[for all i 2 N , p 2 Ai , q 2 Ai ]) [p 2 F (A1; : : : ; An), q 2 F (A1; : : : ; An)].
Unbiasedness and independence can be obtained from this denition by re-
stricting the quantication over pairs of propositions p; q 2 X to proposition-
negation pairs (i.e., p = :q) and to single propositions (i.e., p = q), respectively.
Monotonicity requires that any additional individual support for a collectively
accepted proposition does not reverse its collective acceptance, and the unanim-
ity principle that any proposition accepted by all individuals is also collectively
accepted. Anonymity, nally, requires invariance of the collective judgment set
under permutations of the individual judgment sets and thus excludes aggre-
gation functions that do not treat individuals equally. These conditions can be
jointly satised, for any agenda, by a consistent (but of course not complete,
nor generally deductively closed) aggregation function with full domain. An ex-
ample is (symmetrical) supermajority voting, where for each prole of consistent
6The results additional agenda conditions are "even-number negatability" and "local
asymmetry" (without them, there are counterexamples). The aggregation condition (unbi-
asedness) is equivalent to ours (acceptance/rejection neutrality) under the stronger rationality
requirement.
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individual judgment sets (A1; :::; An),
F (A1; :::; An) = fp 2 X : jfi 2 N : p 2 Aigj=n  qg,
with the acceptance quota q chosen to be su¢ ciently large (List and Pettit 2002,
Dietrich and List 2007b). The consistency of this aggregation function is easy to
see for q = 1 (in which case deductive closure is still met while completeness is
violated), but it is enough to require q > k 1
k
, where k is the size of the largest
minimal inconsistent subset of X (in which case both deductive closure and
completeness are violated, unless q = 1). It is particularly important to note
that symmetrical supermajority voting satises unbiasedness, i.e., the require-
ment of equal treatment of proposition-negation pairs, while violating acccep-
tance/rejection neutrality. This illustrates that, although acceptance/rejection
neutrality is equivalent to unbiasedness in the full rationality case, the two
conditions come signicantly apart under the requirement of consistency alone.
While unbiasedness is innocuous here, acceptance/rejection neutrality leads to
a dicatorship.
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A Appendix: proofs
To prove theorem 1 and corollary 1, we dene a new logic L and agenda X
induced by the original logic and agenda as follows.
Informally, each old proposition p in X gives rise to two new propositions
ap;:ap in X, where ap means "p is accepted", and :ap means "p is not ac-
cepted" as distinct from ":p is accepted" (a:p). If Y  L is (in)consistent, so is
fap : p 2 Y g in L. Any old judgment set A  X induces a new one A  X,
namely A = fap : p 2 Ag [ f:ap : p =2 Ag; e.g., the empty judgment set A = ;
induces A = f:ap : p 2 Xg. Crucially, A is always complete, even if A was
incomplete; this will allow us to indirectly obtain our results from Dietrich and
Lists (2006) results on the complete case.
Formally, let L = fap;:ap;::ap; ::: : p 2 Xg, a thin propositional language
with a single connective : ("not") and atomic propositions ap, p 2 X. A set
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S  L is consistent (in L) if accepting all propositions p 2 X that S "says"
are accepted is consistent in L: that is, if the set
S = fp 2 X : S entails ap in the sense of standard propositional logicg
(= fp 2 X : S contains, after cancelling double negations "::",
ap or a pair aq;:aqg)
is consistent in L. For instance, if X = fa;:a; a ! b;:(a ! b); b;:bg as in
our example, S = faa; aa!b; a:bg is inconsistent (since S = fa; a ! b;:bg is
inconsistent in L), S = faa; aa!b;:abg is consistent (since S = fa; a ! bg is
consistent in L), S = fab;:a:bg is consistent (since S = fbg is consistent in
L), and S = fab;:abg is inconsistent (since S = X is inconsistent). As is easily
veried, the new logic satises axioms C1 to C4.
Dene the new agenda asX = fap;:ap : p 2 Xg. AsX contains no double
negated propositions, the criterion for consistency of a judgment set S  X
is simple:
S is consistent ,
 fp 2 X : ap 2 Sg is consistent in L
and S contains no pair ap;:ap. (1)
We have already dened the notions of non-simplicity and non-separability.
For the following lemma, two further agenda conditions are needed. An agenda
X is even-number negatable if it has a minimal inconsistent subset Y such that
(Y nZ) [ f:z : z 2 Zg is consistent for some subset Z  Y of even size; X is
locally asymmetric if, for every sub-agenda Z  X, there exists a consistent set
S  X such that S, with all the propositions it shares with Z negated (i.e.,
(SnZ) [ f:z : z 2 S \ Zg), is inconsistent.
Lemma 1 If the original agenda X  L is non-simple and non-separable, then
the induced agenda X  L is non-simple, non-separable, even-number negat-
able and locally asymmetric.
Proof. Suppose X is non-simple and non-separable. By non-simplicity, there
exists a minimal inconsistent subset Y  X with jY j  3. Let Y  = fap : p 2
Y g. Then Y   X and jY j = jY j  3. By (1) and Y s minimal inconsistency
(in L), Y  is minimal inconsistent (in L). So X is non-simple. By (1) and
Y s minimal inconsistency, Y  becomes consistent by negating one or more of
its members ap. So X satises the even number negation condition.
To prove local asymmetry, let Z  X be any sub-agenda. We must specify
a consistent set S  X that is rendered inconsistent by negating the members
shared with Z. As Z is a non-empty union of pairs fap;:apg, there is at least
one pair fap;:apg  Z. If also fa:p;:a:pg  Z, let S = f:ap;:a:pg. By
(1), S is consistent. But after negating the members shared with Z (i.e., all
members) the new set fap; a:pg is inconsistent, also by (1). If fa:p;:a:pg 6 Z,
let S = f:ap; a:pg. Again, S is consistent: if it were not, then by (1) f:pg
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would be inconsistent in L (i.e., :p would be a contradiction in L), and so X
would be separable (into the sub-agendas Xnfp;:pg and fp;:pg), a contradic-
tion. After negating the members S shares with Z (i.e., just :ap) the new set
fap; a:pg is inconsistent, again by (1). This proves local asymmetry.
To show that X is non-separable, consider a partition of X into sub-
agendas X1 and X

2 . We construct consistent sets S

1  X1 and S2  X2 such
that S1 [ S2 is inconsistent. First suppose there is a p 2 X such that ap 2 X1
and a:p 2 X2 . Then the sets S1 := fapg and S2 := fa:pg are each consistent,
by (1) and since no proposition in X is a contradiction (see the argument just
made); and the union S1 [ S2 = fap; a:pg is inconsistent, again by (1). Now
suppose there is no p 2 X such that ap 2 X1 and a:p 2 X2 . Then each of
X1 and X

2 is a non-empty union of quadruples fap;:ap; a:p;:a:pg. So each of
X1 := fp 2 X : ap 2 X1g and X2 := fp 2 X : ap 2 X2g is a non-empty union of
pairs fp;:pg  X, hence a sub-agenda of X. Moreover, X1; X2 form a partition
of X: X1 \ X2 = ; by X1 \ X2 = ;, and X1 [ X2 = X by X1 [ X2 = X.
So, as X is non-separable, there are sets S1  X1 and S2  X2 that are (in
L) consistent with inconsistent union S1 [ S2. It follows, by (1), that the sets
S1 := fap : p 2 S1g ( X1 ) and S2 := fap : p 2 S2g ( X2 ) are each consistent
and have inconsistent union S1 [ S2 (= fap : p 2 S1 [ S2g), as required. 
For the next lemma, a judgment set is fully rational if it is consistent and
complete. An aggregation function is fully rational if it produces a fully rational
judgment set as output; it has universal domain if it accepts the proles of fully
rational individual judgment sets as input.
Lemma 2 The assignment A 7 ! A := fap : p 2 Ag [ f:ap : p =2 Ag denes
a bijection between the consistent judgment sets A  X and the fully rational
judgment sets A  X, with inverse given by A 7 ! A := fp : ap 2 Ag. In
particular, any consistent full-domain aggregation function F for X induces a
fully rational universal-domain aggregation function F  for X, given by
F (A1; :::; A

n) := F (A

1; :::; A

n).
Proof. For all consistent A  X, the set A  X is by denition complete and
by (1) consistent, hence fully rational. The assignment is injective: if consistent
sets A;B  X are distinct, so are A and B. It is also surjective: every fully
rational set A  X is the image of some consistent set A  X, namely of the
set A, since
(A) = fap : p 2 fq : aq 2 Agg [ f:ap : p =2 fq : aq 2 Agg
= fap : ap 2 Ag [ f:ap : ap =2 Ag
= fap : ap 2 Ag [ f:ap : :ap 2 Ag (as A is fully rational)
= A.
The latter also shows that A 7 ! A is the inverse assignment. 
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The next lemmas unbiasedness condition is dened in section 4 (by taking
p = :q in the denition of systematicity).
Lemma 3 In Lemma 2, F  is unbiased if and only if F is acceptance/rejection
neutral.
Proof. First, let F be acceptance/rejection neutral. To show that F  is un-
biased, take any pair ap;:ap 2 X and any proles (A1; : : : ; An); (B1 ; : : : ; Bn)
admissible for F  such that, for all i, ap 2 Ai , :ap 2 Bi , hence (by Bi s full
rationality) ap 2 Ai , ap =2 Bi . So, for all i, p 2 Ai , p =2 Bi . So, as F is
acceptance/rejection neutral, p 2 F (A1; : : : ; An), p =2 F (B1 ; : : : ; Bn). Hence,
by denition of F , ap 2 F (A1; : : : ; An), :ap 2 F (B1 ; : : : ; Bn), as required.
To prove the converse, note rst that F is is retrievable from F  via
F (A1; :::; An) = F
(A1; :::; An). (2)
Now let F  be unbiased. To show that F is acceptance/rejection neutral, con-
sider a p 2 X and admissible proles (A1; : : : ; An); (B1; : : : ; Bn) such that, for
all i, p 2 Ai , p =2 Bi. Then, for all i, ap 2 Ai , :ap 2 Bi. So, as F 
is unbiased, ap 2 F (A1; :::; An) , :ap 2 F (B1; :::; Bn), hence (by F s full
rationality) ap 2 F (A1; :::; An) , ap =2 F (B1; :::; Bn). So, by (2) applied to
the proles (A1; :::; An) and (B1; :::; Bn), p 2 F (A1; :::; An), p =2 F (B1; :::; Bn),
as required. 
Lemma 4 In Lemma 2, F  is a dictatorship if and only if F is.
Proof. If F is a dictatorship, say with dictator i, F  is given by
F (A1; :::; A

n) = (A

i ) = A

i ,
hence is a dictatorhip. To prove the converse, recall (from the proof of lemma
3) that F is given by (2). So if F  is a dictatorship, say with dictator i, F is
given by
F (A1; :::; An) = (Ai) = Ai,
hence is a dictatorship. 
Using the above lemmas, we derive Theorem 1 from the following result.
Theorem 2 (Dietrich and List 2005, theorem 2) For a non-simple,
non-separable, even-number negatable and locally asymmetric agenda, every
fully rational universal-domain aggregation function satisfying unbiasedness is
a dictatorship.
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Proof of theorem 1. Take any non-simple and non-separable agenda X and
consider any consistent full-domain aggregation function F satisfying accep-
tance/rejection neutrality. By lemma 1, the induced agenda X is non-simple,
non-separable, even-number negatable and locally asymmetric. Take the in-
duced aggregation function F  of lemma 2. By lemmas 2 and 3, F  is fully
rational, universal-domain and unbiased, hence by theorem 2 a dictatorship.
By lemma 4, F is therefore also a dictatorship, as required. To prove that the
agenda condition of non-simplicity and non-separability in theorem 1 is tight
(for n  3), note that if X violates non-simplicity majority voting (with full
domain) among a given odd-sized non-singleton subset of N is consistent, as
well as acceptance/rejection neutral and non-dictatorial; and if X is separa-
ble, say into sub-agendas X1 and X2, the full-domain aggregation function that
makes some individual dictatorial on X1 and another one dictatorial on X2 is
consistent, as well as acceptance/rejection neutral and non-dictatorial. 
The next lemmas independence condition is dened in section 4 (by taking
p = q in the denition of systematicity)
Lemma 5 Any consistent full-domain aggregation function satisfying accep-
tance/rejection neutrality also satises independence.
Proof. Let F be a consistent full-domain aggregation function satisfying accep-
tance/rejection neutrality. By lemmas 2-3, F induces a fully rational universal-
domain unbiased aggregation function F  for X. So F  is independent by
lemma 1 in Dietrich and List (2005). To show that F is independent too, take
any proposition p 2 X and proles (A1; : : : ; An); (B1; : : : ; Bn) admissible for F ,
such that, for all i, p 2 Ai , p 2 Bi. Then, for all i, ap 2 Ai , ap 2 Bi. Thus,
as F  is independent, ap 2 F (A1; : : : ; An) , ap 2 F (B1; : : : ; Bn). So, using
(2) as in earlier proofs, p 2 F (A1; :::; An), p 2 F (B1; :::; Bn), as required. 
Proof of corollary 1. Consider any consistent full-domain aggregation func-
tion F satisfying acceptance/rejection neutrality. Take any non-simple and
non-separable sub-agenda Y  X (if there exists none, the result vacuously
holds). By lemma 5, F is independent, hence induces a well-dened full-domain
aggregation function F Y for the sub-agenda Y . F Y inherits from F its consis-
tency and acceptance/rejection neutrality. Thus theorem 1 applies to F Y , and
corollary 1 follows immediately. 
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